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Introduction
On the 9th September 1948, on the main place of Pyongyang, the communist leader 
Kim Il-sung proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). In 1955 Kim Il-sung offi cially also introduced 
his ideology called Juche (master of the destiny) to the North Korean population, 
which is a mix of traditional values and communist dogma. In this article, I pro-
pose an approach that assumes the presence of Confucianism1 (유교 – yukyu) and 
Neo-Confucianism (성리학 – seonglihak) in the North Korean ideology especially 
1 Confucianism is a Chinese ethical and philosophical system developed from the teach-
ings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius. The core of Confucianism is humanism, the belief that 
human beings are teachable. Confucianism focuses on the cultivation of virtue and maintenance of 
ethics. More information is available in the following book: Confucianism for the modern world, 
eds. Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003; Remco 
E. Breuker, Writing History in Koryo, “Korean Histories”, 2.1, 2010, p. 59. This ideology was intro-
duced by An Yu, a Korean who studied in China and who returned to Korea in the beginning of the 
fourteenth century. More details can be checked in the following excellent book: Chang, Carsun. 
The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, Bookman Associates, New York 1957.
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during the Kim Jong-il’s era2. I insist also on the fact that Kim Il-sung and Kim 
Jong-il reinvented and manipulated various forms of Confucianism because they 
wanted to legitimate their domination. I will try to demonstrate that the Kim Jong-
il’s regime not only exhibited some several Confucian aspects but also emphasized 
them in comparison with the Kim Il-sung regime.
The North Korean ideology is the main driver of the North Korean politi-
cal system. The political system is compounded of several institutions, rules and 
political actors who interact for exerting a political power. In North Korea the 
political system is placed after the ideology. This ideology is therefore dictating 
who should rule and which organizations are at the top of the North Korean po-
litical system. Therefore, the political system of North Korea is only a branch of 
the North Korean ideology. To understand the North Korean society, its history 
and its way of functioning, it is rather essential to look at it from the North Ko-
rean historical point of view, searching consequently for what dictates people’s 
lives. It has to be noted that North Korean politicians operate under conditions 
of a specifi c rationality, created by their Juche ideology (주체사상 – juche sa-
sang). Given the intense and complete immersion in this ideology, North Korean 
elites do not consider all possible alternatives that might be available to decision-
makers in other countries. Although North Korea’s political doctrines may appear 
at least strange to Westerners, as far as it represents a contemporary expression 
of thought that are deeply embedded in Korean history (i.e. events related to 
the Japanese occupation, consequences of the Korean War, unfi nished confl ict 
with South Korea). The Juche ideology that was developed by Kim Il-sung was 
also basically coming from the traditional Korean political thought. According to 
a North Korean defector issued from the North Korean leadership, Kim himself 
has acknowledged that he drew the term and idea of Juche from Korean scholars 
taking inspiration from Confucian ideas3. 
Theories of the Confucian civilization
According to the South Korean researcher Hahm Chai-bong, in the Confucian 
paradigm, there are some essential patterns used for the understanding of Far East-
ern Cultures: human being is not an individual; he lives in a network of relations. 
There are no distinctions between the public and the private sphere. The father’s 
2 Due to a lack of credible information, it’s an incredibly huge task and therefore a great 
challenge to determine when the Kim Jong Il’s era started. I made the hypothesis that Kim Jong-il 
started to rule (at least partially with Kim Il Sung) in 1970 when he was nominated to the position 
of deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers Party 
(조선로동당 – Choson rodongdang)
3 Interview with a defector realized in October 2010. For security reasons, the identity of 
the defector is not revealed. 
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responsibility is similar to the one of the rulers’ of a state. Therefore, the family 
which is a private sphere is simultaneously a public one4. 
According to the eminent German research Gerhold Becker, Confucianism 
is however a changeable ideology. He states that nowadays Confucian societies do 
not respect moral and ethical values5. This phenomenon was called a “moral empti-
ness”. Social relations started to be deteriorated. The Confucian society may also 
be a prosperous ground for corruption due to the system of mutual dependences. 
Stefania Skowron-Markowska considers that Confucius grew up in a com-
plicated historical reality6. Local confl icts were not rare. These events made an op-
portunity for new philosophy to set up new values. For example when he travelled 
around China, Confucius observed major changes such as the disintegration of the 
family, the apparition of classes. Therefore, he deduced that the society would need 
a cure in order to solve all these previously mentioned problems. He considered 
that the source of a perfect society would be a traditional family living in a strict 
hierarchy, and in great esteem of his elders. He considered that the basic familial 
relation were decisive for the stabilization of the family. 
According to Lukasz Gacek, the historical aspects of the Asian policy are not 
always applied in Modern Asia. For example this Polish researcher underlines that 
the Chinese emperor may perform his duties in a wrong way. People were given 
a right to overturn a bad ruler, without taking in account the global interest7. 
The North Korean model may also have its roots in the Legalism. The Le-
galism was developed in ancient China in the period of the Qin dynasty (221–206 
BC). The main goal of the legalists was to create a strong and centralized state. The 
legalists suggested an implementation of a system of awards and punishments. The 
mechanisms proposed by the legalists led to an increase of the spying control of 
the population. According to Lukasz Gacek, many solutions were adapted by com-
munist authorities in modern China8. 
4 Hahm Chai-bong (1997), Confucian Tradition and Economic Reform in Korea, Korea 
Focus, May-June, Vol. 5, No. 3. 
5 Becker Gerhold, Wypełnianie moralnej pustki. Konfucjanizm a kwestie etyczne moder-
nizacji Chin, Chiny, [in:] Tomala Karina, Gawlikowski Krzysztof (eds.), Przemiany państwa i spo-
łeczeństwa w okresie reform 1978–2000, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Wydawnictwo Trio, 
Warszawa 2003, pp. 120–130.
6 Stefania Skowron-Markowska, Lunyu as anthropological sources of knowledge con-
cerning contemporary Chinese society, [in:] Adam Jelonek, Bogdan S. Zemanek (eds.), Confu-
cianism Tradition – Toward the New Century, wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2008, 
p. 41.
7 Łukasz Gacek, Confucianism and Politics, [in:] Adam Jelonek, Bogdan S. Zemanek 
(eds.), Confucianism Tradition – Toward the New Century, wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 
Kraków 2008, p. 67.
8 Ibid., p. 67.
122 NICOLAS LEVI
Confucianism during the Kim Il-sung’s era9
The battle of Kim Il-sung against feudalism
From 1945 to 1954 the North Korean political system repudiated Confucianism 
and historical legacy which was considered responsible for the problems of North 
Korea10. For example starting from the 1950’s, the regime’s fi rst reforms promul-
gated by Kim Il-sung were processed through the land reform which aims at de-
stroying the colonial institutions. North Korean communist institutions confi scated 
land and properties possessed by the Japanese eradicating the economic base of the 
traditional kinship community. The fi rst stage of this socialist reform used many 
ideological slogans calling for the abolition of established feudalistic institutions 
but did not directly challenge the basic ideological roots of Confucianism in Korea. 
North Korea also never tried to break up the family unit even though it did attempt 
to weaken the value of family and abolish cultural resistance to socialist idealism. 
The state’s coercive reform was successful in abolishing feudalistic culture. It is 
also evident that it weakened overall traditional culture and institutions. Therefore, 
residuals of Confucianism and traditional family culture persisted. Between 1948 
and the early 1960’s, the traditional Confucian expression “show fi lial piety to par-
ents” was not used offi cially in the state’s suppressive mobilization11. In this period 
the political position of North Korea was too weak on the global scene; Kim Il-sung 
was too immature to use some elements of the Korean national history. Kim Il-sung 
was much more dependent on his soviet advisors who recommended him rather 
to implement a Stalinist regime in North Korea. Nevertheless, two years after the 
death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, Kim Il-sung brought up the Juche Idea, his ideology 
which was based on “independence, self-reliance” and on some Korean social and 
historical concepts. The Juche Idea is a political thesis of Kim Il-sung which says 
that the Korean masses are the masters of the country’s development. According 
to ideologists, the Juche is based on the idea that “man is the master and decides 
everything.”At the beginning (the term of Juche was used for the fi rst time by Kim 
Il-sung in December 1955), the Juche Idea was formulated as principles that the 
government uses to justify its policy decisions12. 
9 Kimilsungism can be defi ned as the ideology and system of power instituted by Kim 
Il-Sung. In 1948, when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established, Kim Il-Sung 
became the fi rst premier of the North Korean communist regime. Until his death in 1994, Kim 
strongly ruled the country, sharing the power with Kim Jong Il in the late 1960’s. Kimjongilism is 
also often used. This term is related to the ideology of Kim Jong-il which is based on Kimilsungism. 
Kim Jong Un: DPRK to carry forward revolution, “China.org.cn”, 12th June 2012 
10 Waldemar Dziak, Confucianism and Kimilsongism, [in:] Adam Jelonek, Bogdan S. Ze-
manek (eds.), Confucianism Tradition – Toward the New Century, wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiel-
lońskiego, Kraków 2008, p. 169. 
11 Those who are married and families receive protection from the State. It is strongly af-
fi rmed that families are the cells of the society and shall be well taken care of by the State.
12 Michael Breen, Kim Jong Il: North Korea’s dear leader who he is, what he wants, what 
to do about him, John Wiley&Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd, Singapur 2004, p. 67–70.
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In order to justify the independence of the North Korean model, Kim Il-
sung also had to copy the Confucian patterns. The North Korean Constitution of 
1972 itself identifi es the family as a cell in the body of the society and the State 
as an organ looking after its cells13. The primary goal of using the socialist family 
cell ideology was to integrate the family into the state. The North Korean consti-
tution eliminated all traces of feudalism and focused on the party and Suryŏng 
(the leader) while being in revolutionary service to the socialist state14. The gov-
ernment in the state constitutes a prolongation of the family where the head of 
the family constitutes the father. Obedience and duties have to be performed to-
ward the father and the government. Therefore, the North Korean society is often 
described as being Confucian or Neo-Confucian. It seems that this system has 
borrowed a lot from the ideology known as “Legalism” which was adopted by 
the Wei State of the fi rst Chinese emperor. In the 14th century, Confucian scholars 
were buried and all books of philosophy other than legalist tracts were burnt. 
This doctrine implemented during the China’s Ming dynasty (1364–1644) is a re-
interpretation of Confucian teachings. 
Ideological transformation
Despite the initiatives of the domestic policy mentioned before, the ancestral Con-
fucian system centered on patriarchy was maintained in North Korea. One of the 
incorporated elements was the social division. One of the fi rst social divisions 
which existed in Asia was already introduced in the Han dynasty in the 1st cen-
tury AD15. During the Choson Dynasty (1392–1910), a system of classifi cation of 
the population was spread over the Korean population. Each man who was over 
15 years old was forced to wear a special tablet indicating his name, address and 
age. According to the Polish researcher Waldemar Dziak from the Polish Academy 
of Sciences, those with higher positions had tablets in ivory, lower categories peo-
ple had tablets in wood16. As a comparison the North Korean system also assumed 
a division of the population into 3 classes and 47 sub-classes (the Songbun policy). 
This division was established in order to assess the loyalty of the North Korean 
13 Socialist Constitution of The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 27th December 
1972, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang 1972, article 63.
14 This domestic revolution policy was offi cially disclosed in a 1961 speech by Kim Il Sung 
entitled “The Duty of Mothers in the Education of Children”: Speech at the National Meeting of 
Mothers, 16th November 1961”, [in:] Kim Il Sung Works, Vol. 15, Korean Workers Party Press, 
1963 Pyongyang.
15 Krzysztof Gawlikowski, The Western and the Confucian approaches to war: The uni-
verse based on struggle versus the universe based on harmony, [in:] Adam Jelonek, Bogdan S. Ze-
manek (eds.), Confucianism Tradition – Toward the New Century, wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagielloń-
skiego, Kraków 2008, p. 31. 
16 Waldemar Dziak, Confucianism and kimilsongism, [in:] Adam Jelonek, Bogdan S. Ze-
manek (eds.), Confucianism Tradition – Toward the New Century, wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagielloń-
skiego, Kraków 2008, p. 169.
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population to Kim Il-sung. The Songbun policy prevents disloyal elements from 
becoming members of the KWP17. Each class of citizens had different privileges 
and restricted rights. Interestingly in both periods, the concept and the social strati-
fi cation was accepted by the population18. 
Confucianism was not only a philosophical and ethical system but also a cult 
of the family. Everyone was expected to show fi lial piety towards their parents, 
ancestors and the king. Participation in family sacrifi ces helped to link the indi-
vidual to the monarch, who was considered the ‘father’ of the national community. 
Traditional Korea, in other words, was a ‘Family-State’ that equated loyalty to the 
king (patriotism) with fi lial piety. Thus, Confucian culture logically had to become 
a topic of propaganda in the 1970’s19. Kim Jong-il made therefore the cult of Kim 
Il-sung the most extreme in the world (as an acceptance of the notion of fi lial piety). 
In the early 1970’s, he created and organized the “4.15 Creation Group” named 
after Kim Il-sung’s April 15 birthday which created classics believed to be written 
directly by Kim Il-sung20. For Kim Il-sung’s seventieth birthday, Kim Jong-il man-
aged the construction of the Kim Il-sung stadium21. In this way, Kim Jong il wanted 
to demonstrated that his fi lial piety was greater than the one of the population. 
In Kim Il-sung’s speech the essential aspects of feudalistic Confucian ideol-
ogy that have remained within the popular culture is the logic of traditional Confu-
cian culture centered on patriarchal authority. The dominating discourse came to 
involve the state’s increased effort through the process of social reform to absorb 
the traditional system and culture as infl uenced by Confucianism. Confucian cul-
ture became a propaganda tool to increase the regime’s stability beginning in the 
late 1960’s. This traditional Confucian culture tended to strengthen the function 
of family as a cell. That’s why Kim Il-sung, considered as the head of the “Ko-
rean family” was frequently described as a person with Confucian virtues22. For 
examples, the Party openly describes Kim Il-sung as a god – the “Sun of Love” 
–“superior to Christ in love, superior to Buddha in benevolence, superior to Con-
fucius in virtue and superior to Mohamed in justice”23. Furthermore, the Confucian 
17 James Pearson Daniel Tudor, North Korea Confi dential, Tuttle North Clarendon 2015, 
p. 98. 
18 Krzysztof Gawlikowski, The Western and the Confucian approaches to war: The 
universe based on struggle versus the universe based on harmony, [in:] Adam Jelonek, Bogdan 
S. Zemanek (eds.), Confucianism Tradition – Toward the New Century, wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiel-
lońskiego, Kraków 2008, p. 32.
19 In his speech “On Questions about Dealing with Our National Cultural Heritage,” Kim 
Il-sung said: “We must not, in disregard of this fact, reject the artistic works of the past blindly, 
simply because they are tinged with Buddhism or with feudal-Confucian ideas. We must develop 
their progressive and people-oriented aspects critically”.
20 North Korea: a dead president’s society, “The Independent”, 8th July 2004. 
21 Ibid.
22 Debra A. Miller, North Korea, Greenhaven Press, Drake Road 2004, p. 31. 
23 Jasper Becker, Rogue regime: Kim Jong Il and the looming threat of North Korea, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 77.
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view compares the political system to the human body, where the country leader 
is like the brain and the people the body that must carry out the leader’s decisions 
and commands. A similar analogy applicable in Confucianism is that of a wise, 
all knowing father who takes care of the loyal nation. Koreans were used to these 
concepts and therefore Kim Il-sung was able to use them in propaganda to encour-
age a kind of collective political loyalty to support its regime. Regarding educa-
tion matters, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il had differences of opinion. Kim Il-sung 
thought that boys and girls should not be together in school. He also prohibited 
dating and marriage among students. In the 70’s, many North Korean students who 
studied abroad came back to their home country suggesting that a mixed system is 
better. Kim Il-sung considered them as revisionists24. 
If we view North Korea as an extension of the Choson Kingdom, the dy-
nastic succession is a rule. Following the deaths of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, 
Kim Jong-un (김정은) became the ruler of North Korea. It has to be said, that in 
the Choson dynasty, a teenager could become the king even when his father died 
prematurely. Thus, blood is the prime criteria for a royal family and for the continu-
ation of the North Korean Regime. 
Eventually, Confucianism placed a heavy trust emphasis on earning the trust 
of the people as part of governance and politics and reverence to elders, the new 
dynasty strove to heighten political transparency and accountability by maintaining 
thorough records. Each government bureau kept a daily record of their work called 
Deunnok (Daily Administrative Records of Bureau). In this regards, the Chunchug-
wan (Offi ce of Annals Compilation) was the body responsible for collecting these 
daily records and publishing them at regular intervals as Sijeonggi (Current Admin-
istrative Records). Choson also began from the beginning of the dynasty onwards 
to publish detailed pictorial records of signifi cant state events and ceremonies such 
as royal marriages, royal funerals, royal sacrifi cional rites, royal banquets, king’s 
procession and the construction and repair of palaces. These records included intri-
cate details pertaining to such aspects of ceremonies as the procedures, participants 
and expenses involved. In North Korea, the notion of records and controls emerged 
already in the 1950’s when Kim Il-sung was nominated as the head of North Korea 
and during the political purges which took place in these times in North Korea. 
Confucianism during the Kim Jong-il’s era
From the late 1960’s, at the time when Kim Jong-il emerged at the head of the 
Organization and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Korean 
Workers Party25, the state-dominated discourse about Confucian culture entered 
24 John H. Cha, K. J. Sohn (eds.), Exit Emperor Kim Jong-il – Notes from His Former 
Mentor, Abbott Press, Bloomington 2012, p. 40.
25 Choe Sang Hunn, Korea Reports Death of Offi cial Guiding Succession, “New York 
Times”, 5th June 2010. 
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into active political discourse. For the fi rst time “Ŏbŏi” (어버이/Father or even 
Parents) discourse emerged and was linked to full-scale ideological legitimization 
of the stable socialist family-state. It eventually led to the formation of the previ-
ously mentioned “father” discourse26. It has to be said that Kim Jong-il was at the 
head of these campaigns. The offi cial ideology was composed of terms related to 
the religious terminology such as “faith”, “believers” and “miracles” which are 
deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The fi nal aim of the North Korean 
ideology was to build a “heaven on earth” which reminds religious goals. Kim 
Jong-il also created a large pantheon of North Korean leaders and heroes who par-
ticipated in the struggle against Japanese and in the Korean War. These people are 
Kim Il-sung (the North Korea “God”), Kim Jong-il (“Jesus”) and Kim Jong-suk 
(the mother of Jesus “Mary”) and other members of the Kim family.
Kim Jong-il elaborated also a major cult toward his father Kim Il-sung. Kim 
Il-sung started to be a representation of the image of the State Emperor who is the 
“father of the nation”27, and a “sage” who can be “a teacher”. 
Kim Jong-il, who will later inherit Kim Il-sung’s supreme political power, 
tried to theoretically justify his own absolute power and advocate a new Confucian 
form of socialism. This can be illustrated by his thesis “Theory of the Socio-Polit-
ical Organism” published in 1987. In the process of the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il 
father-to-son transfer of power, the North Korean regime consequently restored 
the traditional logic of “loyalty and fi lial piety” in political discourse. The trans-
formation of North Korean society’s Confucian culture revealed in the process of 
ideological justifi cation a type of Confucian family-state that went to extremes in 
the union of loyalty and fi lial piety. The aim of Kim Jong-il was the justifi cation 
accomplished when the fi lial piety at home extending to the fi lial piety in the one 
social family was in accordance with loyalty to the state. Starting in the 1970’s 
(when Kim Jong-il started to work in the Organization and Leadership Department 
of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party, i.e. the most powerful or-
ganization in North Korea), children were taught to respect not only their parents, 
but also the parents of Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung. According to defectors, the 
Confucian principle of fi lial piety had been even reinforced concerning the son’s 
duty to his parents during the Kim Jong-il’s regime. In the 1980’s, young people 
were more often taught to consider what their parents had done for the country dur-
ing their lifetimes.
In economic issues, the presence of Confucian values is also strong: Dur-
ing the Kim Jong-il’s era, especially in the 1980’s and 1990’s, North Korea has 
26 There are changes in the titles used to refer to Kim Il Sung. As for the titles of Kim Il 
Sung, he was called “General” after liberation, and “Leader” or “Premier.” However, this began 
to change after the mid 1960s: Our father Kim Il Sung the Ruler. Jin Woong Kang, The ‘Domestic 
Revolution’ – Policy and Traditional Confucianism in North Korean State Formation, Harvard Asia 
Quarterly, 1st February 2008.
27 Choe Sang Hunn, Korea Reports Death of Offi cial Guiding Succession, “New York 
Times”, 5th June 2010.
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defi nitely used some of the anti-mercantile elements of the Confucian tradition: the 
authoritarianism has been strengthened. Confucian values are also transposed on 
the organizations of North Korean Companies. The North Korean state is control-
ling most industries and has the monopoly over the distribution of commodities 
like salt28. Analyzing some North Korean companies, we can remark that values 
like hierarchy and familistic groupism are included in the management of North 
Korean companies. (The biggest companies in North Korea belong to members 
of one family, for instance the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies 
is directly connected to the Kim Jong-un’s family29). It means that the Confucian 
ethic is incorporated into business activities. 
Concerning the question of equality between men and women, the notion of 
the subordination of women30 has also been strengthened during the Kim Jong-il’s 
reign. It is due to the fact that the former wife of Kim Il-sung, who was an enemy 
to Kim Jong-il, Kim Sung Ae (김성애) was always defending the rights of women 
(she was the chair of the Korean Democratic Women’s Union). Thus, this organi-
zation has been even more powerful than some Party Organizations31. However, 
Kim Sung Ae was never really accepted by Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il kicked her 
out from the North Korean political scene. Afterwards, women started to be more 
subordinated than in the past. 
The structural frame of the North Korean system was set in place in ac-
cordance with the dynastic systems of the Ancient Korea. Respect for elders was 
emphasized. Like the Choson Kingdom, North Korea has been brutal and uncom-
promising to any rebellious fi gures challenging the Kim dynasty. Even the dictato-
rial and brutal leader Kim Jong-il showed his respect for the elders. In comparison 
to Kim Il-sung, he reinforced the cult of the members of his family and was strictly 
cooperating with the old generation of North Korean politicians. These people, 
such as Kim Yong Nam (김영남 – North Korean Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly, born in 1928), Kim Ki Nam (김기남 – vice-chair-
man of the Committee for Peaceful Reunifi cation of the Fatherland, born in 1926), 
O Kuk Ryol (오극렬 – a general of the North Korean Army, born in 1931) and 
others are still at the head of North Korea in spite of their ages. 
When Kim Jong-il emerged at the head of North Korea (unoffi cially in the 
1970’s, offi cially in the 1980’s), he tried to reinforce the Korean nationalism. Not 
28 Jasper Becker, Rogue regime: Kim Jong Il and the looming threat of North Korea, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 75.
29 Interview with a defector realized in October 2010. For security reasons, the identity of 
the defector is not revealed.
30 According to the Confucian model of society, women had to occupy a position lower 
than men. Most Confucians accepted also this issue as being natural.
31 Interview with a high ranking party defector realized in June 2009. For security reasons, 
the identity of the defector is not revealed. Another defector also stressed that according to Kim 
Jong Il’s edicts the competences of Women Political Organizations were minimized already in the 
late 1970’s.
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only politicians promoted the Korean culture but also various artists32. The situation 
was similar by the late Choson period when a national enlightenment movement, 
which combined nationalist ideologies and faiths, had already formed outside the 
scope of Confucianism. This movement appeared as a diverse intellectual move-
ment promoting awareness of Korean culture’s unique identity. Key spokesmen 
promoted an enlightened, nationalistic perspective within historical studies, and 
Korean language studies. The tradition of strong nationalism among the Korean 
people coexisted with another tradition called sadaechuii33. Kim Jong-il’s (and to 
a less extent Kim Il-sung’s) real antipathy towards foreign infl uence serves to in-
tensify the nationalism of the North Korean people, who were told that world civi-
lization originated from the Korean peninsula34. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il took 
their inspiration also from Buddhism. Thus, it has to be quoted that according to 
the Buddhist ideology, the king was the highest ruler in the society. The people con-
sidered the king as the living Buddha of Buddhism. He’s the spiritual and material 
leader who redeemed the world and the being who connect the past, the present and 
the future. The will of the king was decisive and this was justifi ed by Buddhism. 
Such characteristics of Buddhism in relation to the king’s ruling authority are ap-
pearing in the establishment of the Kim Il-sung’s system and especially during the 
Kim Jong-il’s era. The king (Kim Jong-il) claimed to have been chosen as the ruler 
according to the myth (Kim Il-sung).
Concluding Remarks
As a conclusion, I would like to underline that the historical roots of some aspects 
of the North Korean ideology are based in Confucianism. Nevertheless, there is 
no direct referring to Confucianism in the North Korean ideology. North Korea’s 
socialist reform, which continued from liberation through the post-war revolution, 
was centered on a policy of domestic revolution. The key-contradiction originated 
in the discord between traditional culture and forced reform. Eventually, the patri-
archal system was accepted during the Kim Jong-il’s era, adopted by the state and 
even elevated to use as an ideological tool to justify its Confucian form of social-
ism. Nevertheless, it’s important to underline that there is a big danger in consider-
ing Korea as a homogeneously Confucian society. Koreans are sometimes viewed 
as double-faced. On the one hand, Koreans are self-controlled and meticulous in 
their fulfi llment of their obligations. On the other hand, Koreans have reputation 
for emotionalism35. 
32 Interview with a defector realized in October 2010. For security reasons, the identity of 
the defector is not revealed.
33 Sadae (사대), lit. “serving-the-Great”. 
34 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, Addison-Wesley, Reading 1997, p. 401. 
35 On the same way, the shamanism, one of Korea’s most characteristic cultural expres-
sions, contrast with the self-control idealized by Confucians.
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Nevertheless, while the North Korean government is always more opposed 
to any kind of offi cial religion, as Bryan Myers mentioned, Confucianism is all 
about tempering instincts with intellectual discipline, with book learning. Then 
North Korea is much closer to Imperial Japan and fascist states that we saw in Eu-
rope in the 1930’s in that it glorifi es pure racial instincts36. 
It has to be underlined that on the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, 
after the end of the Korean War, each new tradition was created without any refer-
ences or justifi cations in the Past. In other words, it’s impossible to fi nd inspirations 
from outside. However, the kimilsungism aimed at adopting some foreign solu-
tions with maintaining domestic traditions. Korean communists formed a system 
prepared to function in their own country which was not different from the Soviet 
pattern. The main Korean structures were based on the Soviet model (such as the 
Organization and Leadership Department of the Korean Workers’ Party based on 
the soviet Orgsburo); nevertheless this topic will have to be analyzed within an-
other research article. 
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The main aim of this article is to analyze some aspects of the historical roots of the North Korean 
ideology and political system. This study argues that the North Korean ideology is to a certain 
extent rooted in the historical background of the Korean Peninsula but has also been purposely 
changed and manipulated in form to deal with at-the-time diffi culty and circumstance that the re-
gime faced. Meanwhile what can be observed in the North Korean ideology is that there is no direct 
referring to the antecedents. These claims are illustrated in this article by various primary material 
of a propagandistic nature published in North Korea and by research articles. 
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36 Robert Siegel talks to B.R. Myers, author of the book The Cleanest Race: How the North 
Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters, who takes an unorthodox look at the North Korean 
regime and its people. They discuss the expressions of grief displayed by North Koreans for their 
leader, “npr.org”. 29th December 2011. 

